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ASTRACT Does “managing large pelagic fishes” mean the same thing across the diversity of maritime jurisdic-
tions, governance arrangements, economies, languages, cultures, scales of operation and other features of the Gulf 
and Caribbean region? It would be surprising if it did. Yet international fisheries management urges this mosaic of 
management to become a melting pot; at least integrated, even if differentiated. This paper examines some themes 
underlying whether a mosaic or melting pot is the most apt metaphor for where we are, and are headed, in attempts 
to manage large pelagic fishes in the region. We pay particular attention to the multi-dimensional concept of scale. 
Included are the scales of management units, fisheries authorities, management outcomes, harvest and postharvest 
enterprises, and the interdisciplinary perspectives that can be brought to bear on fishery problems and solutions. 
We are also interested in linkages, because linkage is connected to the scaling-up that is important in a region with 
many small countries and territories. Even if the management of large pelagics starts as a mosaic, coherent patterns 
of sub-regional and regional interactions can conceivably be nested and linked to improve the integration, and hence 
effectiveness, of management interventions … at least in theory.
RESUMEN Significa  “Manejo de grandes peces pelágicos” lo mismo a través de la diversa jurisdicción marina, 
arreglos de gobernabilidad, economías, lenguajes, culturas, escalas de operación y otras características de la región 
del Golfo y el Caribe? Sería sorprendente si así fuera. Sin embargo el manejo internacional de pesca sugiere que 
este mosaico de manejo regional se convierta  en un crisol de razas; por lo menos estar integrado, aunque sea de 
manera diferenciada.  Este escrito examina algunos de los temas subyacentes para determinar si mosaico o un 
crisol de razas es la más apta metáfora para indicar donde estamos, y hacia donde vamos, en nuestro intento por 
manejar grandes peces pelágicos dentro de la región. Ponemos atención particular al concepto multi-dimensional de 
“escala”.  Incluidas están las escalas de unidades de manejo, autoridades de pesca, resultados de manejo,  empresas 
para cosecha y post cosecha  las de perspectivas disciplinarias e inter disciplinarias que puedan aplicarse a los 
problemas y soluciones de la pesca. Estamos igualmente interesados en enlaces, ya que el enlace está conectado al 
aumento a escala que resulta importante dentro de una región con muchos pequeños países y territorios. Aunque 
el manejo de grandes pelágicos empiece como un mosaico, patrones coherentes de interacciones sub-regionales y 
regionales pueden concebiblemente anidarse y enlazarse a fin de mejorar la integración, y por ende la efectividad, 
de intervenciones de manejo… por lo menos en teoría.
 
introduCtion
Wedged between the continental Americas, the Gulf of 
Mexico (GOM) and Caribbean Sea contains more than 100 
million people located in over 30 countries and territories, 
the majority of which are islands. It would be surprising 
if “managing large pelagic fishes” meant the same thing 
across the diversity of maritime jurisdictions, governance 
arrangements, economies, languages, cultures, scales of 
operation and other features that reflect the heterogeneity 
of the GOM and Caribbean Sea. Yet international fisheries 
management trends urge this diverse mosaic to become a 
melting pot; at least integrated in its management regimes, 
even if differentiated to some extent. 
For example, the International Commission for the 
Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT) recommended 
management measures for large pelagic fishes are typi-
cally intended to be uniformly applied in the area. Some 
countries in alliances such as the Organization of Eastern 
Caribbean States (OECS) and the Caribbean Community 
(CARICOM) have harmonized their national fisheries reg-
ulations for demersal inshore and turtle species, and may 
yet do so for large pelagics. Major importing countries 
insist that their Caribbean suppliers meet international fish 
trade and quality standards (e.g., Hazard Analysis Critical 
Control Point systems, European Union Import Standards 
for Fish Products) that extend backwards along the fish 
chain to small-scale harvest operations. However, despite 
these forces of homogenization, there are other factors that 
maintain heterogeneity and reinforce the differences in the 
fisheries and fisheries management regimes of the region. 
These differences include the sizes and capacities 
of the fisheries management authorities, the scales of the 
industry components (vessels, landing facilities, process-
ing plants, etc.), the relative size and value of the com-
mercial harvest, the values of recreational fisheries, the 
institutional and governance relationships among resource 
users or other stakeholders and managers, the capabilities 
of fisheries research agencies, and more. The differences 
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are reflected in the approaches to fisheries management, 
the inputs and outcomes, and they apply to all parts of the 
fish chain in both private and public enterprise.
In the management of large pelagic fishes in the region 
there will always be pros and cons as to whether complete 
uniformity (extreme melting pot) is more desirable than 
high diversity (extreme mosaic) or the reverse, or some 
middle ground. The conclusion will often be situation 
(fishery, management measure, country, stakeholder, etc.) 
specific. Leveling the playing field through standardiza-
tion (from reporting procedures to technical regulations) 
may be equitable under some circumstances, but be highly 
inequitable in others where the capacity to mange dif-
fers significantly among fishery participants. However, 
regardless of whether or not industry and management 
diversity is considered “good” or “bad,” fisheries manag-
ers and other stakeholders should be aware of what factors 
maintain or erode diversity to greater and lesser extents. 
Without this knowledge it will be difficult to engineer any 
planned degree of integration which is an important ingre-
dient in maintaining the mosaic without much mixing or 
stirring the melting pot to achieve the best blend. 
This paper examines some of the themes underly-
ing whether “mosaic” or “melting pot” is the most apt 
metaphor for where we are, and are headed, in attempts 
to manage large pelagic fishes in the region through vari-
ous means of integration. We pay particular attention to 
the multi-dimensional concept of scale because it is per-
vasive in the region. We are also interested in linkages 
through networks, because linkage determines whether or 
not scaling-up is feasible. The scaling up of management 
can be desirable in a region with many small developing 
countries and territories that rely heavily on project-imple-
mented fisheries management. Following the introduction 
of what we mean by scale and network, these concepts are 
applied in some brief analyses of fisheries in the GOM and 
Caribbean Sea region. We attempt to provide unconven-
tional and provocative perspectives on these topics, to see 
how well the metaphors fit the situations and to draw some 
conclusions from the findings.
Scale and Network Concepts
The concepts of scale and networks, for the purpose 
of this discussion, are best addressed in the context of 
fisheries governance as a complex adaptive system (CAS) 
and social-ecological system (SES) (Garcia et al. 2003, 
Bavinck et al. 2005, Kooiman et al. 2005, Wilson 2006). 
CAS are highly interactive internally, and often exhibit the 
capacity to self-organize and adapt without outside influ-
ence (Mahon 2005). SES are conceptualized as being far 
more intricately interwoven than is achieved by simply 
fitting humans into ecosystem models or adding natural 
resource dynamics to models of human society. The SES 
view emphasizes that social and ecological systems are 
inevitably linked and integrated, and that the delineation 
between the 2 systems is artificial and arbitrary (Berkes 
and Folke 1998, Anderies et al. 2006).
Scale is a concept common to most disciplines. SES 
operate at multiple scales so it is critical to consider 
the scale or range of scales at which we can collect and 
process information, reach conclusions on and manage 
effectively; ecological scales are both spatial and temporal. 
Social scales also include the jurisdictional and institu-
tional, among others. Integrated into an SES perspective, 
complex and dynamic interactions and feedback loops 
may occur within or across ecological and social scales 
(Cumming et al. 2006).
Using the scheme of Cash et al. (2006), “scale” is 
the overall label of the feature being measured such as 
spatial, temporal, jurisdictional, institutional, management 
arrangements, network, and ecological knowledge scales. 
“Level” is the particular resolution within a scale. “Multi-
scale” means more than one scale, and “cross-scale” 
signifies interactions across them. “Cross-level” refers to 
interactions among different levels within the same scale 
(Figure 1). 
In Figure 1, considering a hypothetical Caribbean 
fisheries example, one may have an international fisheries 
instrument with international jurisdiction (such as the FAO 
Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries) that drives 
fisheries policy at the sub-regional (e.g., eastern Caribbean) 
and country (e.g., St. Vincent and the Grenadines) levels. 
This is multi-scale, cross-scale and multi-level. The inter-
national instrument also drives policy at the national juris-
dictional level (cross-level). In this example, because of 
vessel flagging practices, national jurisdiction may extend 
well beyond the geographic borders of the country. All of 
the above may be top-down (shown by descending uni-
directional arrows), but at lower levels in this multi-scale 
case there are two-way interactions between watershed 
and settlement as fisheries is integrated into coastal man-
agement according to the FAO Code. There are also orga-
nizational interactions such as of the Fisheries Division 
with communities (e.g., village council jurisdiction) and 
individuals (who have personal social networks) for get-
ting the Code implemented.
Three common “scale challenges” include: the failure 
to recognize important scale and level interactions alto-
gether (ignorance); persistence of mismatches between 
levels and scales (mis-match); and failure to recognize het-
erogeneity in the way that scales are perceived and valued 
by different actors (plurality)(Cash et al. 2006). In natural 
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resource management systems, social-ecological scale 
mismatches are evidenced by losses of adaptive capac-
ity and resilience (Cumming et al. 2006). Successful co-
management institutions provide examples of approaches 
to scales and linkages that address cross-scale governance 
issues (Berkes 2002, 2006). This brings us to networks. 
In the context of this paper, network analysis focuses 
on the interactions between SES components and the ways 
in which the structure of nodes and links, and the flows 
contained within, affects the performance of the system on 
a variety of scales at various levels. Network analysis has 
been applied to both social systems and ecological sys-
tems, combining qualitative and quantitative information, 
but seldom integrating SES (but see Janssen et al. 2006). 
Network architecture or structure is of little value unless 
the nature of flows through the network and its purpose 
are also known. For example, a dense network may be 
good for the rapid diffusion of a beneficial innovation or 
information, but it may also spread irresponsible fishing 
methods or constrain individual fisheries managers from 
experimentation for adaptation if close-knit cliques are 
formed.
Depending on the type of analysis (food web, commu-
nity, fishery, business) network nodes can be individuals, 
organizations, countries or whatever entities are appropri-
ate. The focus on ties (relations between the focal node and 
other nodes) and links (relations only between other nodes 
in the focal node’s network) as the main features that con-
fer network properties, rather than the nodes themselves, 
is distinctive to network analysis. Ties and links between 
nodes may be characterized in innumerable ways. In 
social network analysis the strengths and directions of the 
flows of information, assistance, funds, conflict and other 
types of exchanges are quantified and described. Although 
networks are often illustrated 2-dimensionally as flat 
structures, adding a third dimension or height can display 
differences in levels within a scale, disparities in power 
and other variations which may be perceived as inequitable 
or otherwise problematic, and hence attract management 
attention (Figure 2). 
Figure 2 depicts a hypothetical personal social net-
work with a longline captain (LLC) as the focal node. His 
network contains his crew (LLF), the boat owner (BO) and 
fisheries officials of various ranks. The most powerful of 
the latter is the Chief Fisheries Officer (CFO) with whom 
there is only a top-down relationship. Communication 
with the CFO requires the captain to go through his boat 
owner and a fisherfolk leader (FFL), or he can speak to 
one of the lower ranked fisheries officials (DC or SFO). 
Typically, hierarchical public administration is illustrated 
by the links between the fisheries officials. We now turn 
to how scale, linkage and network concepts are applicable 
Figure 1. Spatial, jurisdictional and network multi-level scales showing cross-scale and cross-level linkages (Based on Cash et 
al. 2006). Single headed arrows indicate unidirectional action (such as top-down influence) while double headed arrows indicate 
two-way interaction (such as negotiation).
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to the management of large pelagic fishes in the GOM and 
Caribbean.
Fisheries perspectives
In the GOM and Caribbean, large pelagic fishes are 
the targets and by-catch of commercial, recreational and 
subsistence fisheries that range from large scale to very 
small scale. The species and species groups we refer to are 
primarily the large tunas, billfishes, swordfish, dolphinfish, 
wahoo and large mackerels. Sharks are often included 
as by-catch. The most recent information on the status 
of stocks and fishery assessments is from ICCAT (www.
iccat.int). However, although stock status, fishery trends 
and regulatory measures are clearly pertinent to manage-
ment, they are not the main focus of this paper. Instead, 
we examine some of the practical consequences that scale, 
linkage and integration have for management, by means of 
brief examples mainly from a CARICOM perspective.
The mosaic aspects of wider Caribbean geography 
are conspicuous in the illustration of marine jurisdic-
tions comprising hypothetical Exclusive Economic Zones 
(EEZs) based on the principle of equidistance (Figure 3). 
This jurisdictional mosaic consists of 26 countries and the 
19 dependent territories of 4 other countries; the majority 
of these countries and territories are small island develop-
ing states (SIDS) with high dependence on fishing and 
tourism. There is considerable spatial and seasonal hetero-
geneity in marine productivity and oceanographic features 
(Mahon 2002). In terms of ecological linkages, the trophic 
connections between productive coastal areas and less pro-
ductive offshore planktonic or pelagic systems are poorly 
understood for this region. Food chain linkages between 
exploited resources with differing scales of distribution 
and migration through the EEZs or across the high seas, 
such as flyingfish and large pelagics, have not received 
much consideration in management. However, supporting 
research is currently in progress. Knowing such linkages 
may be critical to preventing the stock depletion that has 
occurred in many other areas and systems where predator-
prey relationships have not been adequately considered in 
the exploitation of large pelagic species (Mahon 2005).
A second, but patchier, mosaic layer superimposed 
on these EEZs comprises the various organizations and 
alliances to which the countries and territories in the 
region belong. The spatial scales of the organizations 
can be illustrated by highlighting their membership. 
This is also shown in Figure 3 for CARICOM coun-
tries, but there are several other organizations relevant 
to large pelagic fisheries including the Western Central 
Atlantic Fishery Commission (WECAFC) of the Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO), OECS and Organización 
del Sector Pesquero y Acuícola del Istmo Centroamericano 
(OSPESCA) among others (Chakalall et al. 1998, 2007).
It is immediately obvious that this patchwork of marine 
jurisdictions and organizations poses serious challenges to 
the integration of fisheries management in the region, and 
especially so in the case of large pelagics that range beyond 
the region (Singh-Renton et al. 2003). Spatial (ecological) 
and jurisdictional (management) scales are generally not 
well matched at any level, and this is well known (Mahon 
and McConney 2004a). However, little attention has been 
paid to the lower levels on the spatial and jurisdictional 
scales and how these are linked to the higher levels. An 
exception is the analysis by Berkes (2006) of tuna manage-
ment in the eastern Caribbean within the context of cross-
scale governance (Figure 4). He argued that international, 
regional, national and community levels are mis-matched 
and poorly linked. He goes on to point out that this is also 
true for the scales of power and knowledge seldom consid-
ered in management.
Using the case of small-scale fishers in Gouyave, 
Grenada, it has been shown that their local fishery knowl-
edge has no way of making an impression on the complex 
science used in ICCAT assessments (Grant and Berkes 
2004, Grant and Rennie 2005). ICCAT wields immense 
power that affects the livelihoods of artisanal longline 
fishers and constrains their opportunities. The impacts of 
Figure 2. Network of fishery stakeholders with power level 
hierarchy superimposed CFO = Chief Fisheries Officer; SFO 
= Senior Fisheries Officer; FO = Fisheries Officer; dC = 
data Collector; FFL = Fisherfolk leader; BO = boat owner; 
LLC = longline captain (the network node here); LLF = long-
line fisher. Arrows denote communication with direction(s) 
indicated, solid for ties and dotted for links. dashed lines in 
triangle define three different levels of power. State stake-
holders are shown as oval shapes and industry stakeholders 
in rectangular boxes.
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ICCAT allocation criteria and management measures at the 
community level are not well documented in a form that 
is likely to be consumed by the international Commission 
even if socio-economic matters were to be given more con-
sideration. Indeed, even at the regional level of CARICOM, 
there is little that has been done by Member States to com-
prehensively document the socio-economic, institutional 
and linkage aspects of their fisheries. A study to examine 
these aspects has only recently been undertaken in the 
context of establishing a Common Fisheries Policy and 
Regime (Phillips et al. 2006). However, much more needs 
to be done to integrate livelihood perspectives into the 
management of large pelagics if small fishing communities 
are to be integrated into management.
The above analysis argues for bottom-up integration in 
fisheries management, but it would be erroneous to assume 
that information on international or regional fisheries man-
agement routinely penetrates beyond the national level to 
reach fishing communities, fisher organizations and indi-
vidual fishers. While fisheries managers in the region may 
well speak and understand the language of ICCAT or other 
international fisheries bodies such as the bodies of FAO, 
this is not the case for fisherfolk. A barrier to top-down 
integration and sharing of fisheries management outlooks 
often exists at the national level due to the limited exten-
sion and outreach capacities of small fisheries authorities. 
Local level fisherfolk are typically unaware of the scale 
mis-matches and lack of integration since ICCAT and the 
concepts of managing large pelagics are completely alien 
to them. National barriers to integration and scaling up are 
perhaps the most persistent. 
In considering the issue of capacity, Mahon and 
McConney (2004b) argue that fisheries authorities in small 
island developing states (SIDS) cannot simply be scaled 
up to perform as miniatures of the large and relatively well 
funded agencies of developed countries such as the federal 
National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) and the state 
authorities in the United States of America. These authors 
observe that technical capacity to manage fisheries will 
almost always be below optimum, and suggest that it be 
supplemented by more people-centered approaches. In the 
case of Barbados, the fisheries authority set out, as advice 
to policy-makers, the costs and benefits of becoming an 
ICCAT Contracting Party prior to the country becom-
ing a member. In this policy proposal, the costs included 
recruiting an additional fisheries officer to join the single 
fisheries biologist primarily responsible for all science 
associated with the country’s nine fisheries management 
plans. Although the policy decision was to join ICCAT, the 
additional officer was not approved. The main justification 
for the additional officer was to bridge the gap between 
the regional and international levels and the local fishing 
industry. The intent was to “translate,” in real time, ICCAT 
communications so that the local longline industry would 
Figure 3. The wider Caribbean region highlighting hypothetical EEZs of CARICOM countries (Adapted from Haughton et al. 
2004).
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gain a much better appreciation of how large pelagic fishes 
are managed, or not managed, and make meaningful inputs 
into the Barbados perspective and policy on management. 
Although all cannot be blamed on the absence of a single 
officer, the very limited capacity of the fisheries authority 
to engage the industry has severely constrained integration 
at national and higher levels.
For a fuller explanation of constraints on integration 
at the national level we also need to look beyond the man-
agement authority and examine the linkages to policy deci-
sion-making and to fisherfolk collective action as interest 
or pressure groups. Policy-making and constituent lob-
bying are closely related in political processes. Although 
large pelagic fisheries are currently or potentially impor-
tant to the societies and economies of most CARICOM 
countries (Mahon and McConney 2004a), these fisheries 
seem to be of limited political interest and do not attract 
the attention of ministers responsible for fisheries. Again 
taking Barbados as an example, large pelagics dominate 
foreign exchange earnings from fisheries through export 
of tunas and swordfish. The scale of fishing is small, but 
larger than what was described above for Grenada. Yet few 
linkages exist between the industry and fisheries authority 
that assist in empowering the latter successfully to pursue 
policy decisions and to build management capacity to par-
ticipate more effectively in ICCAT. Because the industry 
shows no interest in ICCAT, and because large pelagics 
are not very prominent icons in local fisheries culture, 
Figure 4. Cross-scale networked governance in Caribbean tuna management. ICCAT=International Commission for the 
Conservation of Atlantic Tuna, CRFM=Caribbean Regional Fisheries Mechanism, OECS=Organization of Eastern Caribbean 
States, FAO=Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, WECAFC=Western Central Atlantic Fisheries 
Commission (Adapted from Berkes 2006). dashed lines of FAO WECAFC and around its member states indicates relationships 
of secondary importance. dark-filled fishing industry circles represent dense networks of non-State stakeholders
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the Fisheries Division is unlikely to be able to attend its 
meetings or to obtain annual budgetary allocations for 
improving research or management. This contrasts sharply 
with the fisheries for flyingfish and sea urchins in which 
cultural and popular aspects are prominent and these 
fisheries receive a considerable amount of attention from 
policy decision-makers. The lesson here is not to underes-
timate the importance of local politics, power and culture 
in fisheries management. If managers wish large pelagics 
to attract the attention of policy-makers to management 
issues, they may have to focus first on increasing interest 
among their constituents.
These constituents include fisherfolk organizations 
that are typically too weak and poorly organized to act 
collectively as interest or pressure groups, resulting in 
dependence on a few key individuals. Such persons may be 
involved in the harvest, processing, marketing, distribution 
and trade of large pelagics. Some may be members of fish-
erfolk organizations such as associations and cooperatives, 
but in CARICOM countries most of these groups are root-
ed in the harvest rather than postharvest sector. Significant 
proportions of the large pelagics landed in most countries 
are purchased and exported by private or public sector 
companies that tend to be individualistic rather than inte-
grated in a postharvest organization. Also, as the scale and 
capital investment of fishing enterprises increase, non-fish-
ing vessel owners may be less inclined to be in fisherfolk 
organizations since wealth is often accompanied by power 
and socio-economic status. As such, their individual inter-
ests can be met without organizational affiliation. Hence 
collaborative relationships are likely to be much stronger 
among fisher captains and crew than among boat own-
ers and persons in postharvest. Social networks are often 
important assets in coping with the uncertainties of fish-
ing even more than formal organizations are (McConney 
1997). Therefore, strategically, fisheries authorities should 
aim to link with influential fishers of large pelagics in 
order to pass on communications concerning the manage-
ment of the industry. If social networks are dense, then 
the diffusion of information can be fast and extensive 
with these captains acting as nodes. If fisheries authorities 
have an appreciation of social network structure, and the 
Figure 5. Strengths and weaknesses of linkages in recreational fishing at three levels on the jurisdictional scale. Solid arrows are 
strong linkages, dotted arrows are weak linkages. directions are indicated by arrow heads. Recreational fishery stakeholders 
are shown as hexagons, and commercial fishery stakeholders as rectangles.
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flows within them, it is possible for them to be used instru-
mentally in fisheries management to increase the degree 
of integration. Longline fishers are known to have trans-
boundary networks for information exchange and assis-
tance at sea that span much of the south-eastern Caribbean 
(A. Kinch, Barbados longline fisher, pers. comm.). These 
informal fisher networks are likely to be more efficient 
for transmitting information than any official national or 
regional system of communication.
The recent initiative of CARICOM leaders to strength-
en and deepen regional integration by establishing a single 
market and economy to replace the common market may 
have significant implications for the management of large 
pelgics and other shared species. The intentions of this 
initiative are to: 1) fully integrate and liberalize the internal 
markets and economies of CARICOM States to facilitate 
the structured integration of production of goods and ser-
vices; 2) facilitate the unrestricted movement of capital, 
labour and technology; and 3) allow access by nationals 
to the collective resources of the region on a non-discrimi-
natory basis (CARICOM 2002). The common fisheries 
policy being developed as part of this process is designed 
to give effect to these general objectives while ensuring 
effective conservation and management of the fisheries 
resources.
Another related integration initiative that may become 
relevant to the management of large pelagics is the CRFM’s 
project to strengthen and link local and national fisherfolk 
organizations into a regionally networked system. If this 
initiative is successful, it may be more feasible for fisher-
folk organizations to participate in fisheries management 
through the bodies of the CRFM such as the Caribbean 
Fisheries Forum that addresses policy advice and the 
Large Pelagics Working Group (LPWG) that was set up in 
2000 to conduct and contribute to fishery assessments. To 
date the LPWG has functioned as a loose network mainly 
of individuals who are responsible for data management 
in national fisheries authorities and who share informa-
tion just prior to the CRFM science meetings in order to 
determine and report on fishery and resource trends. These 
assessments have been assisted by scientists from outside 
the region (UK and USA) thereby creating brief additional 
linkages. A weakness in the LPWG networking is, howev-
er, that the inter-sessional activities, linkages and commu-
nications are not well developed; a constraint related again 
to the limited capacities of both the CRFM Secretariat and 
its Member State fisheries authorities. This working group 
is in urgent need of strengthening if the CRFM is to have 
a stronger presence at ICCAT and if it aspires to becom-
ing the regional fisheries management organization for the 
pelagic species that are not of great immediate interest to 
ICCAT (e.g., dolphinfish, wahoo, blackfin tuna), perhaps 
under some type of inter-agency cooperation agreement.
In the management of the postharvest sector, the 
small-scale fishing industries have learned about ICCAT 
through some of the trade requirements such as swordfish 
certificates of eligibility to reduce the harvest, or at least 
the landing and export, of undersized fish. Many fishers 
in the eastern Caribbean are also aware of the trade and 
conservation issues associated with bluefin tuna that com-
plicate their rare incidental catches of these prized animals. 
It is possible that more is known about the conservation 
and management of large pelagics through the practice 
of trade than through the dissemination of information on 
harvest regulations such as size limits and quotas. In the 
case of trade, the US market and that country’s adherence 
to ICCAT management measures have tended to integrate 
management across exporting countries through business 
networks. 
Caribbean commercial fishers are becoming increas-
ingly knowledgeable about the rules and restrictions 
governing recreational fishing, and are aware of how 
recreational lobbyists have reduced or excluded com-
mercial harvests in some places and fisheries in the USA. 
For anglers, many gamefishing clubs will be made aware 
by an organization such as the International Game Fish 
Association (IGFA) of current responsible fishing prac-
tices such as tag and release and size limits (Antia et al. 
2000). Tournament anglers travel to fish under the rules in 
other countries more often than commercial fishers since 
there are no access agreements covering large pelagics in 
the CARICOM region. From a network perspective there 
are strong connections among anglers as a community of 
interest. The connections between the gamefishing bod-
ies and national fisheries authorities, and between anglers 
and commercial fishers, are likely to be fewer and weaker 
(Figure 5). 
This network information is pertinent to initiatives 
such as that of The Billfish Foundation to improve con-
servation in the region. Knowing the linkages facilitates 
directing effort and information to where success is most 
likely.
Of mosaics and melting pots
The brief analysis presented here strongly suggests 
that large pelagics require more attention from fisheries 
managers in the region, but the managers also need new 
tools and perspectives to improve their chances of suc-
cessful management. The mosaic metaphor sets a scenario 
in which the entities are poorly connected or integrated 
and attempts to scale up will be confronted by many 
boundaries and barriers. The melting pot suggests strong 
management in the gom and Caribbean
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integration while maintaining some differentiation or 
recognizable diversity with few obstacles to scaling up. In 
the GOM and Caribbean the management of large pelagic 
fishes is extremely weak and is still mostly a mosaic (little 
integration) with some areas that are melting pots (stron-
ger integration) such as among OECS and CARICOM 
Member States. 
Informal linkages among fishers and linkages related 
to fish trade or recreational fisheries seem to be better 
developed than more formal linkages among manage-
ment bodies and between them and either policy-mak-
ers or fisherfolk. A critical area for future management 
research could be the characterization of fisher social net-
works. Regarding the “scale challenges,” in the GOM and 
Caribbean, there is little ignorance about issues of scale, 
but there are scale mis-matches and plurality issues. These 
need to be urgently addressed if the management of large 
pelagic fishes is to be improved, integrated and scaled up 
where possible. 
Not all aspects of these problems can be tackled 
simultaneously. It is necessary to identify critical areas for 
integration and determine what needs to be scaled up since 
fisheries authorities will remain constrained by limited 
capacity in relation to their areas of responsibility, at least 
in CARICOM countries. Use of complex adaptive systems 
concepts such as scale and networks in interdisciplinary 
fisheries research guided by social-ecological systems 
perspectives will help to create new views for fishery 
managers. Managers and researchers need to draw more 
upon emerging social science and management theory to 
address the human dimensions of management and to deal 
with the pervasiveness of constraining power dynamics 
and conflict in the management of large pelagic fishes. 
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